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The Sacramento - San Joaquin Delta is California’s hydrological hub in a system that wheels water from where it falls in 
the north to where it is used in the south. This hub 
has been in operation since the 1940s, when the 
Federal Central Valley Project went into operation. 
In the 1970s, its importance grew as the State Water 
Project came on line. Even before the Delta was a 
hub, it was a place where people lived and farmed. 
It was also a place where fresh water from rivers 
(the Sacramento, San Joaquin and others) mixed 
with salty water from the San Francisco Bay to 
form a unique brackish ecosystem.
For many years, the Delta was all things to all 
people – a hub for moving water, a place to live 
and work, and a place of nature. Then the Delta 
estuary began showing strain. Among other signs 
was a decline in the health of the Delta Smelt, 
which lives in the Delta, and salmon and steelhead 
that migrate through the Delta as hatchlings going 
to sea and adults returning to spawn.1
A Dec. 14, 2007 decision by Judge Oliver 
W. Wanger of the US District Court in Fresno 
has made the Delta Smelt into one of the most 
(in)famous species in the West (Department of 
Water Resources 2007). In a nutshell, Wanger said 
that the pumps that export water from the Delta 
and into the Central Valley Project and State Water 
Project harm the smelt – both through higher 
mortality (they die of fatigue when the pumps affect 
water flows) and morbidity (they are weakened by 
changes in the salinity and competing with invasive 
spieces for food). Since the smelt is protected under 
the Endangered Species Act (ESA), its survival 
has a higher priority than operating the pumps. 
To protect the smelt, Wanger ordered pumps to be 
operated in accordance with guidelines designed 
by the US Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). FWS 
issued these guidelines, in the form of a Biological 
Opinion, on Dec. 15, 2008. Since the Opinion 
has done nothing to ease pump operations, it 
is unpopular with groups that prefer otherwise. 
Wanger has also ordered a new Biological Opinion 
on salmon and steelhead, which is likely to find 
similar, adverse effects from pumping.
All of this “fishy” business is relevant because 
California was in its third year of drought. Recent 
exports from the Delta have averaged about 6 maf 
(million acre-feet), divided roughly 40/60 percent 
between the Central Valley Project and State Water 
Project.2   Deliveries in 2009 are currently projected 
to be 10/60 percent of contracted volumes to Central 
Valley Project agricultural and urban interests and 
40 percent to all State Water Project contractors. 
Although less than 20 percent of the reduction in 
deliveries can be blamed on the Wanger decision, 
every drop counts.3
For some, Wanger’s decision was a welcome 
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acknowledgement of trouble in the Delta. For 
others, Wanger’s decision is a costly mistake.4 
Although these positions appear irreconcilable, 
everyone does agree on one thing: The Delta is 
broken and should be fixed.
In this paper, I describe efforts to fix the Delta, 
beginning with relevant features (history, problems, 
and stakeholders) in the first three sections. In  the 
next two sections, I discuss possible solutions. In 
the final section, I conclude that we are unlikely 
to see a Delta solution anytime soon. Why?  It’s 
not just that the problems are complex, but also 
because resolution would not benefit politicians 
and bureaucrats.
Water and Fish versus Money and Votes
Let us begin by oversimplifying history into two 
eras.5  Before World War II, California’s population 
and economy was broadly compatible with its 
physical and biological characteristics. Many of 
the redwoods still stood, many rivers were not 
dammed, and many canals were local.6  Southern 
California had a smaller share of the state’s 
population. Agriculture was labor intensive and 
locally irrigated. Food traveled a shorter distance 
to the table.
This world was not to last for long; change 
was already coming. During the 1930s, Hoover 
Dam, the Central Valley Project, and the Colorado 
River Aqueduct (which connects the Colorado 
River to urban Southern California) were under 
construction. Although the Depression and World 
War II had major impacts on these projects, the 
impacts basically sped things up. The defense 
industry grew near Los Angeles, agriculture 
became more mechanized, and technology (cars, 
roads, air conditioning) grew cheaper and more 
common.
After World War II, we entered an era of 
increasing prosperity. The Central Valley Project 
allowed dry-farmed land to be irrigated, the 
Colorado River Aqueduct allowed Los Angeles 
and other cities to expand, and petroleum allowed 
us to use more energy in more ways. This Age of 
Abundance continued well into the 1960s, when 
negative environmental impacts (smog, dirty water, 
vanishing forests, etc.) became too big to ignore.
The environmental movement moved from fringe 
(Silent Spring was published in 1962 and Science 
published “The Tragedy of the Commons” in 
1968) to mainstream (Hardin 1968).  In 1970 came 
the first Earth Day, the creation of the EPA, and 
a significant strengthening of the 1963 Clean Air 
Act. The Clean Water Act was signed in 1972. The 
environmental movement gained political strength 
because people worried about the increasing impact 
of negative externalities (unintended costs that 
you bear when someone else acts) on their lives. 
Because negative externalities are not factored into 
decisions made in markets (e.g., gasoline buyers 
do not pay for pollution), they are considered a 
variety of “market failure.” The generic response 
to market failure is a call for political intervention, 
and the environmental movement uses political 
tools to advance their goals.
Here’s the point of this long overview: The 
Delta has been instrumental in creating many 
economic benefits, but these benefits have come 
at an environmental cost. Since environmental 
issues are generally resolved through politics 
– not economics – it is hard to reconcile or trade 
economic benefits with political costs. (By the end 
of this essay, you may decide that “hard” is perhaps 
too soft a word! )
Physical and Biological Features
In its “natural” state, the Delta receives an 
average of approximately 21 maf of water from 
the Sacramento (85 percent) and San Joaquin (15 
percent) rivers. These flows vary with precipitation 
(from lows of 8.5 maf to highs of 52 maf) and 
season (peaking in late-spring/early-summer). The 
variation in these flows and their interaction with 
the salt water of the San Francisco Bay has created 
a unique ecosystem. Historically, water would flow 
through into the Delta and west into the Bay and 
Pacific Ocean, via the Golden Gate (see Figure 1).
After gold was discovered in California in 1849, 
the population of the Bay Area rapidly increased. 
Settlers in the area found the Delta to be fertile 
but dangerous. The Sacramento and San Joaquin 
rivers would flood in winter. The Delta was a maze 
of peat islands and channels. This ecosystem was 
good for fish and bugs but not so great for cities 
and farms. So people began “fixing” things.
Political and Economic Features
The first major modification to the Delta 
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happened to the north, where surface water 
diversions from the Sacramento River were used 
for farming and mining. Both of these “beneficial 
uses” created property rights but the rights had 
different definitions. Farmers next to rivers had 
riparian rights to divert for local use. Miners (and 
farmers) with appropriative rights could divert for 
use elsewhere. The idea of appropriating water 
to be used away from the river or watershed was 
born in the western U.S. (Powell et al. 1879). 
Although appropriation was a good idea then, 
“over appropriation” has created complications. 
One obvious complication concerns return flows, 
seepage, etc. A riparian diversion will have a 
milder impact on local ecology than the same 
appropriative diversion.
The second major modification began with 
farming in the Delta. Farmers built levees to 
Figure 1. The Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta.
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prevent flooding of Delta islands and to protect the 
rich, peaty soil. Over time, land elevation dropped 
from a combination of erosion, oxidization, 
compaction, and reduced augmentation from 
annual floods. When the surface dropped below 
sea level, islands and levees became “polders” and 
“dikes,” respectively. These Dutch words brought 
Dutch technology – pumps that moved seeping 
water from inside dike-protected polders to the 
water channels outside (see Figure 2).
The third major modification began with the 
Central Valley Project, a massive system of 20 
dams/reservoirs and hundreds of miles of canals 
north and south of the Delta designed to regulate 
water flows (reduce flooding and increase reliable 
delivery) and improve water quality (lower 
salinity) for communities and farmers north, south, 
and in the Delta. The biggest beneficiaries of the 
Central Valley Project were farmers south of the 
Delta. They got more water, of better quality, in 
places that had not received water in the past. The 
CVP had two major impacts: it dampened seasonal 
fluctuations in water flows to and through the Delta 
(drying out flooded areas and irrigating dry areas), 
and it redirected flows from the Delta. Central 
Valley Project pumps pulled water that normally 
flowed west and out the Golden Gate south and 
into the Delta-Mendota canal. Although exports 
were not absolutely large (perhaps 2-3 maf out of a 
total flow of 21 maf), they were large relative to the 
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Figure 2. From islands and levees to polders and dikes to submerged land. (Source: Mount and Twiss 2005).
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volume and direction of natural flows.
The Central Valley Project’s success attracted 
attention from farmers and urban interests in the 
southern end of the state, and the State Water 
Project was soon under consideration.7 The first 
contracts were signed in 1960 by an urban water 
wholesaler, the Metropolitan Water District of 
Southern California, which ended up with about 
half of all the contracts. The other contracts were 
signed by urban and agricultural contractors. In 
contrast to the Central Valley Project, most SWP 
water goes to urban areas. The State Water Project 
extended a trend begun by the Los Angeles and 
Colorado River Aqueducts: importing water from 
distant places to enable more people to settle in the 
dry region. Although some may claim that these 
projects brought water to the people, the reverse 
was also true.8
What Killed the Fish? 
It’s widely acknowledged that the Delta 
ecosystem has deteriorated, a result with many 
causes. In this section, I give a brief description of 
the leading suspects. All of the causes have some 
effect, but it is hard to attribute relative magnitudes. 
That do not keep people from assigning blame to 
others and deflecting criticism from themselves. 
Unfortunately, a lack of understanding (and 
agreement on attribution) makes it more likely 
that the cost and effectiveness of Delta ecosystem 
restoration will be higher in political, economic and 
biological terms. In the worst case, massive resource 
expenditure would result in no improvement.
Levees and Subsidence
The Delta was a wetland before the Gold Rush. 
Ever since then, “reclamation” has changed the 
ecosystem in artificial ways that reflect human 
priorities. Even worse, the Delta’s geography 
has hardened around human institutions (roads, 
islands/polders, water flows and quality) – stifling 
the variability within which native species co-
evolved.
Invasive Species
The accidental and intentional introduction of 
invasive species (asian clam, striped bass, etc.) has 
harmed native species through competition over 
food and direct predation. Invasive species thrive 
in the artificially stable ecosystem that humans 
have created to maintain water quality for export. 
Interestingly, an effort to remove striped bass (a 
fish that competes with and eats smelt) is opposed 
by sport fishermen (Zieralski 2009).
Water Flows and Quality
Although the Sacramento River brings an average 
annual flow of about 18 maf to the Delta and about 
18 maf of water flows through the Golden Gate 
each year, the timing, direction, and quality of these 
flows has changed. Spring floods no longer occur. 
Fresh water ebb and flow is dampened. Pumps that 
export from the southern end of the Delta change 
local water dynamics (timing, temperature, salinity, 
direction). Local and imported agricultural and 
urban discharges lower water quality. Numerous 
chemicals and residues of varying concentrations 
interact in ways that nobody understands.
Climate Change
Although the effects of climate change on 
the Delta are not yet troublesome, the arrival of 
(predicted) “flashier” water flows, warmer water, 
hotter temperatures, and higher sea levels will not 
be helpful. Things will be even worse if climate 
change increases demand and reduces supply in 
the state.
All Water Politics Is Local
Because the Delta lies at the heart of California’s 
Table 1. Stakeholders, solutions and costs (estimated from capital costs with a five percent discount rate).
Supporters Favored Action Annual Cost
In Delta Save Delta $250 million
N and S of Delta Peripheral Canal $250 million
Environmentalists Radical Ecology $4 billion
Bureaucrats Muddle Along zero
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water distribution system, “local” events affect 
people in distant places. These people, naturally, 
complain when their situation deteriorates, and 
their politicians head off to Sacramento to lobby 
for relief. Unfortunately, the usual solution (throw 
money at the problem) is not available because it 
is very expensive to spend money to make water.9 
Without money as a lubricant, politicians are forced 
to play a zero-sum game of water allocation where 
the gains to one group are the losses to another. Not 
surprisingly, these “games” are less about fun and 
more about high-stakes rhetoric, brinkmanship, 
and maneuvering. In this section, I describe the 
main stakeholders in the Delta. Table 1 gives an 
overview of the groups, their favored actions, and 
back-of-envelope annual costs of those actions 
(discussion actions and costs in Section “Fight and 
Compromise”).
Communities in the Delta
Historically, most Delta residents have used 
local fresh water to grow crops. In the past 20-
30 years, the urbanization of the Bay Area-
Sacramento corridor has brought greater economic 
diversity to the area and increased the density of 
communication, natural gas, and rail and road 
networks. The Delta also has recreational value to 
locals and outsiders who enjoy its beauty, boating, 
and wildlife. The two million person Sacramento 
metropolitan area has affected the eastern side of 
the Delta. Floodplains have been drained, protected 
with levees, and developed. Urban areas draw out 
fresh water and discharge treated waste water (and 
sometimes raw sewage) in the Delta area.
These communities overwhelmingly support 
extending the status quo. Local farmers benefit 
from the north-south flow of water pulled by Central 
Valley Project and State Water Project pumps 
because the passing water stays fresh year-round. 
Local communities depend on State-supported 
levee maintenance to keep their “islands” dry and 
infrastructure operative.
Communities South of the Delta
People south of the Delta fall into three 
categories. The farmers on the east side of the 
San Joaquin Valley get their water from rivers and 
ground water.10  The farmers on the west side get 
their water from the Central Valley Project, State 
Water Project and ground water. Local communities 
are heavily dependent on agricultural production. 
Urban dwellers in Los Angeles and further south 
get their water from the State Water Project. 
Generally speaking, all of these communities want 
water exports from the Delta to continue.
Communities North of the Delta
Communities living in the Sacramento River 
watershed north of the Delta fall into two camps: 
Farmers who can use their water to grow local 
crops or sell that water downstream, and non-
farmers who benefit from farmers’ economic 
activity. When farmers sell or lease their water, 
these non-farmers may suffer “third party impacts” 
from reduced economic activity.11 There is some 
controversy over the magnitude and direction of 
these impacts (positive, negative, zero), but many 
people believe they exist. These beliefs often lead 
to local ordinances prohibiting water transfers 
outside the area.
Bureaucrats
California’s Department of Water Resources 
operates the State Water Project. The Bureau of 
Reclamation (BuRec) operates the Central Valley 
Project. Generally speaking, bureaucrats at these 
organizations want to keep water flowing into 
their projects.12 California’s Department of Fish 
and Game and Environmental Protection Agency 
are similar to their Federal counterparts. They are 
culturally prone and legally directed to support 
policies that benefit the environment without 
regard to the economic costs of those policies.
These agencies have many overlapping interests, 
responsibilities and powers, which makes it 
difficult to know who can get what done. In 1994, 
the CALFED (CALifornia state agencies and the 
FEDeral agencies) Bay-Delta Program (CALFED) 
was formed to coordinate the actions of 25 
bureaucracies with a stake in the Delta. After an 
initial surge of enthusiasm, activity and spending 
of billions of dollars, CALFED has been dismissed 
as ineffectual (Legislative Analyst’s Office 2006).13 
In 2006, Governor Schwarzenegger created the 
Delta Vision Blue Ribbon Task Force (Delta 
Vision) to extend CALFED. Delta Vision had more 
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participants and a limited lifespan (two years), but 
it has no power to impose a solution.14
Environmentalists
Many environmental groups (many of them 
based in – and supported by citizens of – the San 
Francisco Bay Area) oppose water transfers as 
harmful for the local ecology, advise that water be 
used within its watershed, and lobby for discharge 
(waste water, storm water, tail water) that is free of 
contaminants (salt, ammonia, pesticides, fertilizers, 
etc.).They blame transfers for urban sprawl, loss of 
agricultural land, and wetland destruction.15  Since 
pumps that move water also use vast amounts of 
energy (the State Water Project uses 2–3 percent 
of the state’s electricity), environmental groups 
decry the carbon footprint of the State’s water 
operations.16
Fight or Compromise? 
So we now arrive at the difficult part of this 
problem – how to reconcile stakeholders’ desires 
into a solution that will “fix” the Delta. As I 
mentioned above, money (even other people’s 
money) cannot fix the Delta. The environmental 
problems can only be addressed through actions, 
i.e., changes in water and land management. For 
example, west side farmers may not sell their water 
rights (so the water can stay in the Delta) because 
they value their farming “culture” or because such 
a deal is politically impossible to sell to local 
residents.17 Keep this reality (and the zero-sum 
nature of political and legal outcomes) in mind as 
we take a look at some proposals to fix the Delta. 
(Recall that Table 1 summarizes this information.)
Muddling Along
First note that business as usual is unacceptable. 
Programs to restore fish populations (hatcheries, 
temperature and salinity management and flow 
control) have not worked very well. North and 
south of Delta interests are upset by uncertain and 
changing restrictions on their water use. Although 
in-Delta communities would be happy to carry on, 
they are also concerned by uncertain regulations. 
Even worse, these communities are likely to 
face catastrophic flooding from rising sea level 
or earthquake-induced levee failure.18  Although 
communities (in, south and north of the Delta) 
and environmentalists do not like business as 
usual, politicians and bureaucrats have benefitted 
(accidentally or intentionally) from the endless 
study and wrangling over solutions. Remember 
who will lose influence and work if the Delta is 
“fixed.”
Save (Our Version of) the Delta! 
Lund et al. (2008: 258) estimated the capital cost 
of protecting current farm operations and “Delta 
community” to be at least $6 billion. These funds 
would go towards levee repairs/upgrades and a 
salt water barrier that would prevent damage from 
earthquakes and rising sea levels, respectively. 
Since protecting built-up urban areas will cost 
$1 billion, let’s assume a marginal cost of $5 
billion to protect the Delta’s rural and agricultural 
communities in their current form.
Peripheral Canal
A Peripheral Canal would convey water around 
the Delta to the pumps in the southern Delta. Lund 
et al. (2008) recommend the Peripheral Canal for 
three reasons:
• The Peripheral Canal would deliver higher-
quality water to the pumps while reducing 
problems with “strange” flow patterns that 
adversely affect native fish. 
• The Peripheral Canal would allow the Delta’s 
salinity to return to “natural” levels and 
variations, which is likely to help native fish 
and harm invasive species. 
• The PC would increase export reliability in 
an area subject to risk from earthquakes and 
rising sea-level. 
Opposition to the Peripheral Canal centers on 
three elements:
Cost: The Peripheral Canal is projected to 
cost $5 billion and will require 2–3 years 
to build. This will only happen if numerous 
and costly studies, lawsuits, and permits are 
settled in favor of the Delta. I estimate a 
minimum of five years to get through that 
preliminary and uncertain step. 
Dead Fish: Native species may not recover 
after the Peripheral Canal is built. 
Water Grab: South-of-Delta interests may 
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use the Peripheral Canal’s capacity to 
export larger quantities of water, fueling 
“unsustainable” agricultural practices and 
urban development.19 
These opponents repeat objections given the 
first time the Peripheral Canal was proposed. 
Voters defeated a Peripheral Canal proposal 
(via ballot initiative) in 1982 in one of the most 
lopsided votes ever. Over 90 percent of northern 
Californians opposed it; about 60 percent of 
southern Californians voted in favor. 
Radical Ecology
Some feel that the best way to fix the Delta is 
to end human influence in the area. Taking the 
recent past as given, this would mean ending 
water exports, and restoring wetlands/land to a 
“natural” state. (Everyone agrees that restoration 
to pre-modern ecology would take many years and 
billions of dollars; more on that below.) Such a 
“restoration” would require massive adjustments 
to land use, employment and lifestyles.
All of these actions will have cash or opportunity 
costs. If water exports ended, then south-of-
Delta interests would see their water supplies 
fall by 6 maf per year. This reduction adds up to, 
respectively, one-third, one-third and one-half of 
the water supply to the South Coast, San Joaquin 
and Tulare Lake hydrological regions (Department 
of Water Resources 2005: vol. 3). The mainly urban 
South Coast region could replace this supply (1.3 
mafy) with reclamation or desalination at a cost of 
roughly $1.5 billion/year.20
The mainly agricultural San Joaquin and Tulare 
Lake regions cannot afford to pay $1,200/af for 
replacement supplies. Those regions would cope 
with reduced deliveries with a mix of water markets, 
conservation and fallowing. As an upper limit to 
this cost, assume that the four biggest agricultural 
counties in the region (Fresno, Kern, Merced and 
Tulare) fallow their land and reduce their output 
in straight proportion to these water losses. Given 
gross agricultural output of $12.6 billion and 33/50 
percent fallowing by, respectively, Fresno/Merced 
and Tulare/Kern, that means an annual output 
reduction of $5.3 billion (United States Department 
of Agriculture 2007). This number is an upper 
limit, since farmers will change their crop mix and 
increase water marketing and conservation.21
Note that the end of exports also means the 
end of annual operating costs from Central Valley 
Project/State Water Project pumping, treatment, 
etc. Assuming an 80/20 ag/urban split and costs of 
$30/$150/af, the savings from not sending 6 mafy 
from the Delta would be about $320 million/year. 
So, let’s say that an upper limit on annual costs 
would be $5 billion.
For an alternative calculation of this $5 billion 
total,22 consider Lund et al. (2008), who say (p. 83) 
“ending water exports, as a long-term water supply 
solution, would probably cost at least $1.5 billion 
per year or perhaps as much as $2.5 billion” Let’s 
call that $2 billion.
As a ballpark figure, let’s say that the cost of 
restoring wetlands would be about $1 billion per 
year.23
Thus, radical ecology would cost from $3 to 
$6 billion per year. Let’s use $4 billion as a round 
number.24
Is $4 billion a year expensive?  That depends. As 
an absolute cost, it’s less than one-quarter percent 
of the state’s $1.6 trillion economy. Relative to 
the one-time, capital cost of the Peripheral Canal 
($5 billion), it’s quite a lot. But then we have to 
consider the environmental value of a radically-
ecological Delta relative to a Peripheral Canal or 
protected Delta. How much is that worth?  Well, 
that’s a subjective question that we can only 
evaluate with a “put your money where your mouth 
is” mechanism, i.e., markets.
Table 2. The market for solutions uses pledges to determine an action, pay the cost of the action and compensate losers.
Action Pledge Cost Votes Population Transfer
Save Delta  $6 bil  $5 bil  1 bil (25%)  3 mil  + $833/capita
Peripheral Canal  $8 bil  $5 bil  3 bil (75%) 15 mil  + $500/capita
Radical Ecology $90 bil $80 bil 10 bil 16 mil - $5,625/capita
A Broken Hub Will Not Wheel: Water Reallocation in California 25
UCOWRJournal of Contemporary Water researCh & eduCation
Markets
Markets are good for reconciling people’s 
subjective values for goods. They are also good at 
testing the strength of people’s “rock-solid” beliefs. 
After all, someone who claims that they would die 
for their point of view should be willing to pay for 
that view, right?  While economists will agree with 
me, others may claim that “moral” questions are 
unworthy of filthy lucre. In other words, they would 
rather spend other people’s money. Obviously 
nonetheless, consider this “market” method of 
reconciling diverging beliefs.
Begin with three different options (save the 
Delta, peripheral canal, radical ecology). Now 
allow individuals (not organizations) to pledge 
money (not votes) to their choices. Money pledges 
are assigned, first, to the total – not annual – cost 
of each choice. Assuming a five-percent discount 
rate, that means $5 billion to protect Delta 
communities, $5 billion for the PC, or $80 billion 
for radical ecology. Remaining money pledges are 
then assigned to “votes,” and the choice with the 
most votes wins. Here’s the cool part: Money from 
the winners goes to the losers in proportion to their 
votes.
For example, Delta residents pledge $6 billion, 
Peripheral Canalers pledge $8 billion, and radicals 
pledge $90 billion. After deducting “costs,” these 
pledges result in, respectively, 1 billion, 3 billion 
and 10 billion votes for each choice. Since the 
radicals are willing to pay the most, they give $10 
billion to Delta residents and PCers, who divide 
that money 25/75 in proportion to their votes. See 
Table 2 for a summary of this process.
Let’s say that there are 3 million Delta 
supporters, 15 million Peripheral Canal-supporters 
(3 million from the Valley and 60 percent of the 
southern coast’s 20 million population – in line 
with the share who voted for the Peripheral Canal 
in 1982) and 16 million radicals (8 million from 
the San Francisco Bay Area plus 40 percent of 
the 20 million people on the southern coast). 
That means per capita payments of $833 to Delta 
residents, $500 to PCers and $5,625 from radicals 
($625 transfer plus $5,000 to implement the plan). 
If participation is lower than 100 percent, per 
capita numbers will rise. In fact, it’s easily possible 
that pledges will not even rise above cost. If that 
happens (e.g., radicals pledge $10 billion – 12.5 
percent of the cost of their vision), then we know 
who really believes – and who wants others to pay 
for their beliefs.
Back to the Future? 
So what will happen? 25 Some people have very 
strong feelings about the Delta and how it should 
be managed. Most of them prefer to fight in the 
courts and legislature – attempting to get their 
preferred outcome at low cost to themselves and 
a much higher cost to others. In short, we will see 
continued conflict (perhaps 3-4 years) over the right 
to allocate “Other People’s Money” towards the 
pet projects of each special interest. Politicians and 
bureaucrats have every reason to encourage this 
fracas. The former because they can wield power 
(and collect “persuasive” campaign contributions); 
the latter because many of them earn a living 
“working” on a solution. Who loses?  The fish.
End Notes
1. Although the winter-run Chinook salmon population 
was known to be in steep decline over twenty years 
ago, responses were mostly ineffective. The 1992 
Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA) 
dedicated 800 taf of water to restoring the health of 
fisheries, but health did not return.
2. One million acre feet (maf) is 1,235 gigaliters. One 
acre-foot is about 326,000 gallons.
3. According to Martin (2009), the California 
Department of Water Resources calculates that 
Wanger-related water restrictions to protect the 
Delta Smelt reduce Central Valley Project/State 
Water Project deliveries by 420 taf (16 percent) in 
dry years and 2.09 maf (30 percent) in wet years.
4. In May 2009, Wanger ordered the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service to consider the impact of reduced 
pumping on humans and communities.
5. Read Department of Water Resources (2005) or 
Carle (2009) to learn about California’s current 
water situation. To learn about California’s water 
development, read Boyle et al. (1971); Kahrl (1979); 
Gottlieb and FitzSimmons (1991); Hundley Jr. 
(1992); Reisner (1993).
6. Although many canals – All-American Canal, 
Hetch Hetchy Aqueduct, Los Angeles Aqueduct 
– transported water over long distances, they were 
typically gravity fed and had smaller capacities. 
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19. The proposed design has high capacity to allow 
heavy exports during high-flood periods. These 
exports are supposed to allow for reduced exports 
in low-water periods. Skeptics think that this “big 
gulp, little sip” operational plan will turn into “big 
gulp, bigger gulp” operational reality; see, e.g., 
Minton (2009).
20. They could reduce demand through higher prices 
and/or conservation at a much lower cost; see 
Loaiciga and Renehan (1997). Also note that 
“homegrown” supplies are more reliable – a feature 
that’s very valuable to local water managers and 
politicians.
21. On the one hand, it does not reflect “income 
multipliers,” losses in capitalized land and/or 
equipment values, etc. On the other hand, these are 
gross revenues, not net profits.
22. They use the entire San Joaquin/Tulare hydrological 
region and assume agricultural areas sell water to 
cities. I assume that those cities get that water from 
desalination, reclamation, etc., leaving more water 
in the region.
23. I ignore the value of land in the Delta for two 
reasons. First, those lands will not suffer reduced 
water deliveries. Second, those lands may be 
submerged by rising sea level or earthquake. I also 
ignore the cost/benefit (of protecting the islands 
from inundation) to non-Delta communities that 
get their water, gas, etc. from networks crossing the 
Delta. 
24. Economists will note that I have not included the 
deadweight loss from reduced consumption of 
water. I exclude this loss for two reasons: This 
surplus could now arrive from the environmental 
benefits of a restored Delta and/or this surplus 
never existed, i.e., “too large” past exports created 
welfare losses. Let’s just say that deadweight losses 
are zero.
25. For alternative views of the future, see Blue Ribbon 
Task Force (2008); Lund et al. (2008); Minton 
(2009).
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When the Colorado River Aqueduct went online in 
1941, it opened an era of larger canals that moved 
water with pumps.
7. Northern Californians unsuccessfully opposed 
State Water Project funding in a 1960 vote. In 1982, 
they were successful at blocking the State Water 
Project’s “completion” – the Peripheral Canal 
(more below).
8. In some places, people only settled after water 
arrived; see Sections 3.3 and 6.5 in Zetland (2008).
9. Desalination and reclamation cost about $600 and 
$1,200/af, respectively. Water users pay about $5 to 
$500/af, a price that reflects the cost of delivery.
10. I include the Exchange Contractors in the east side 
because their legal water rights come from there.
11. Technically, farmers do not own water but water 
rights (usufructory rights), and these rights are 
often leased for one season. Like many, I say “water 
is sold” when I should really say “the usufructory 
water right is temporarily leased.”
12. In Minton (2009), Department of Water Resources’s 
former Deputy Director points out that they get 
over 90 percent of their budget from State Water 
Project revenue.
13. Minton (2009) says that its structure – consensus 
and all things to all people – meant that it was 
designed to fail.
14. Fortunately, CALFED and Delta Vision have 
produced massive volumes of scientific, economic 
and policy documents. See, respectively, http://
www.calwater.ca.gov and http://deltavision.ca.gov.
15. Some environmental groups (e.g., Environmental 
Defense Fund) support sustainable water transfers 
as a means of maximizing the social benefit from 
water.
16. The Central Valley Project produces a net surplus 
of electricity from its hydroelectric capacity, but it 
would be an even bigger net producer if it didn’t 
use most of its electricity for pumping.
17. It is widely believed that west side farmers are 
willing to compromise on most things when there is 
enough money at stake, and that they use “cultural 
damage” as a negotiating tactic, but there are 
certainly people who take farming and community 
seriously enough to resist all buyout offers.
18. These dangers are outlined in Heberger et al. (2009) 
and Lund et al. (2008), respectively. For a rejoinder 
to the earthquake scenarios in Department of Water 
Resources (2009) – but similar to those in Lund 
et al. (2008) – see Adams et al. (2007).
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